The paper contends that bicameral systems, irrespective of their differences in composition and powers, are unfit to represent territorial interests in the national decisionmaking process, except in some residual cases. What subnational entities seek is participation rather than representation. This is why alternative, executive-based institutions in which also the national government is present are mushrooming and second chambers are ineffective as territorial bodies. Furthermore, there is a clear trend to move from bicameralism to bilateralism, meaning that instead of taking advantage of ineffective multilateral institutions, strong subnational units try to channel their claims through bilateral instruments. Overall, the unresolved dilemma of subnational representation has little to do with the architecture of second chambers and rather lays in the tension between individual and collective representation.
Introduction
Second chambers are often considered the litmus test of federal systems. Based on a very partial idea of federalism as aggregative process of previously sovereign entities I , territorial second chambers should represent the institutional compromise according to which subnational units participate in the national decision-making (mostly in legislation, but not only) in exchange of their loss of sovereignty.
Such a view is however very partial and above all it does not reflect comparative constitutional reality. It is partial, since most territorial second chambers II have not been established according to this logic and are indeed composed in a way that does not fully represent subnational entities in the national level. Even more relevant is the fact that comparative constitutional reality tells a very different story as to the representation of subnational unities at the national level, which is that of unfitness of such bodies, irrespective of their set ups and powers, to serve as the voice of subnational units. This paper will start with some reflection on the widespread misunderstanding as to role and function of territorial second chambers (2.), it then looks at alternatives that have been developed in comparative perspective (3.), it focuses on the bilateral trend that is emerging as a consequence of the ineffective and merely collective representation that second chambers can offer (4.) and it concludes by arguing that territorial participation in decisionmaking at national level is far more relevant than territorial representation (5.). Therefore, to represent regions, a fundamental challenge of bicameralism is necessary.
state legislatures and the abolition of instruction and recall shielded them from state influence, making them powerful political representatives whose influence is very little if at all dependent on their electoral constituency.
Furthermore, contrary to what the ex post justification suggested to mute anti-federalist critique, the design of the Senate did not quite result from conceptual considerations as a symbol of the states being still equal. It was rather the result of a pragmatic bargain, the so-
called Connecticut Compromise (also known as the Sherman Compromise or Great
Compromise), to please the smaller states so that 'it is rather muddleheaded to romanticize a necessary bargain into a grand principle of democratic politics' (Dahl 1956: 112) III .
Arguably, there was, however, an element of principle insofar, as the Senate was to reflect the theory of mixed government blending aristocratic and democratic elements, as espoused by British Whigs and Montesquieu (Wood 1998). As an 'American House of Lords' (Swift 2002: 9) it had, like many other cornerstones of the new federation, the function of protecting against excesses of democracy IV .
Be it as it may, the Madison's paradox tells that territorial second chambers, aimed at representing territories and more generally factors other than the democratic element, in the end turned out to do precisely what they were supposedly aimed at not doing. They became political-democratic chambers like the lower houses of parliament, even more in the case of the US Senate as it has considerably more powers than the House of 
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Senate was designed as directly elected by popular vote and the same was introduced in the US by the XVII amendment in 1913. The same happened in the US-modelled federations in Latin America: Mexico, Argentina, Brazil. The Madison's Paradox is confirmed by its sole (apparent) exception, the German
Bundesrat. This is in a way the only second chamber truly representing subnational entities and it does so (at least in principle) because it is not a chamber, as confirmed by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1974 V . In fact it could not be a chamber due to its structural features: ambassadorial model (members are more similar to ambassadors rather than to members of Parliament -Doria 2006), imperative mandate and compact vote (votes are to be cast together) VI . Not being constitutionally a second chamber, it politically became one such, due to the unstoppable tendency of collective bodies to act according to political rather than territorial logic (Luthardt 1999 and Hennis 1998: 159) . Therefore, even functional equivalents to territorial second chambers face the same problem: the dominance of the political over the territorial element, inevitably pushed by the dominance of the democratic over the territorial legitimacy. The dominance of the democratic element is in fact a typical feature of modern and contemporary constitutionalism and parliamentarism. This is why the German model is always admired and looked at (and often overestimated) but never copied VII . In the end, a chamber is simply not the right place to represent territories as it is structurally unfit to perform such function (Ruggiu 2006).
Alternative forms of representation: rather seeking participation?
If a territorial chamber is structurally ineffective as far as effective representation of territories is concerned, it does not mean that the problem of representing regions does not exist. To the contrary, it becomes all the more acute precisely because of the wrong expectation that this might be done through territorial second chambers. As it normally happens in law, if a problem cannot be solved using the prime instrument designed for that, other mechanisms are developed, first informally and subsequently in a more formalized way. Such instruments typically do not replace the former but coexist with them and simply take over (some of) their functions.
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This is precisely what has happened with the representation of territorial claims and interests in the national decision-making. While in some exceptional cases other forms of representation have been adopted within the parliamentary system, as a rule the deficits of representation are compensated by means of inter-governmental, executive-based bodies.
Alternative forms within parliaments
In some cases the parliamentary way for territorial representation is chosen, although not by means of a dedicated chamber. This is the case of constitutionally granted representation of specific territories within unicameral Parliaments, irrespective of the numerical consistency of the territory's population. Since parliamentary representation inevitably turns out to be political and not territorial in nature, effectiveness can be achieved when the territorial and the political element coincide and overlap. This is the case of strong territorial parties which appoint most or even all members of the (first and second) chamber coming from a particular region. This is however a merely political and by no means an institutional solution.
Executive-based institutions
If parliamentary institutions are unfit to represent territories, the logical alternative are institutions representing the executives. Irrespective of the very existence and of the composition and powers of territorial second chambers, nearly everywhere, more or less institutionalized bodies have been established to link subnational entities and the centre at the governmental level.
As part of the wider inter-governmental relations, these institutions present two fundamental elements that differ from territorial second chambers and make them way more effective. First, they are executive, not parliament-based institutions, being composed of representatives of the subnational governments, i.e. of the institutions that really determine subnational policies and are responsible for their implementation (as well as, in many cases, also of considerable parts of national policies). Second, such bodies normally include representatives of the national government as well and are thus institutions that ensure primarily participation and coordination rather than mere representation.
Examples are countless and exist everywhere (Poirier, Saunders and Kincaid 2015), both in traditional (older, coming-together) federal systems and in more recent, devolutionary federal/regional systems. They exist both where traditional federal second chambers are in place, and where second chambers were not born as institutions representing subnational units (such as in devolutionary federal systems but also in Canada), and even in Germany, the only system where an executive-based (functional) second chamber is in place. This means that they are essential irrespective of the existence and of the structure, the powers and the functions of second chambers. Furthermore, such institutions might be self-explaining in cooperative federal systems and more difficult to accept, from a systematic point of view, in dual federations, but they exist even in the latter.
While these institutions have somehow always existed since the inception of each federal system, they mushroomed in the past 40 years, when the era of cooperative federalism boomed, although their formalization depends on the evolution and the features of each federal system XIII . There is thus an obvious link between subnational participation and cooperative federalism, which inevitably shifts the balance on the side of the executives. Based on these comparative achievements, a few telling examples of such alternative forms will be briefly sketched, both in traditional, coming-together federal systems (with either a 'traditional' senate or with a long history of bypassing second chambers never conceived as proper territorial representation) and in more recent, devolutionary federal or regional systems XVI . 
Traditional federal systems

Countries with no (or very little) territorial link in second Chambers
The described trends are even more acute in federal or regional countries whose second chambers never had the ambition to be (fully) territorial. In such systems, subnational participation had to look for alternative channels of participation at the national level from the very beginning, not even trying to use the second chamber for that purpose. These countries are those whose territorial division of power (be it federal or regional in nature) XVIII originate from progressive devolution of powers from a former unitary state and/or whose second chambers were designed to represent -partly or entirely -different forms of pluralism than the territorial one: political, censual, ethnic, aristocratic.
In some case, the territorial element is somehow enshrined in the second chambers, although either only formally (Italy), or ineffectively (Spain) or indirectly (Belgium).
In Spain, the ineffectiveness of the senate despite its constitutional mandate of being a Very similar is the situation in Italy, whose senate is elected on a regional base (article 57 const.) but apart from that it is a purely political chamber. Like in Spain, several attempts to reform the senate by transforming it into a 'proper' regional chamber (better: 
From bicameralism to bilateralism
Next to the growth of executive-based institutions for subnational participation at national level, an additional trend is to be noted as far as the relations between the levels of government in federal and regional systems are concerned. Whenever cooperative forms are not (perceived as) sufficient, or when certain territories present a strong (minority) identity or other factors that make them different from the rest of the country, multilateral fora are normally unfit to fulfil their claims for differential treatment. This is because such fora -second chambers or executive-based participatory institutions -work according to the majority principle, and while they often over-represent smaller units, none of them provides individual subnational units with veto rights. This means that multilateral fora cannot ensure that one subnational unit's position is upheld and an alliance among all other entities overrules any individual position. This is why more and more frequently strong subnational units pursue bilateral instruments for negotiation and cooperation with the national level and very often such fora are legally established since the national level acknowledges that they are necessary.
However, the less effective the multilateral instruments or the more adversarial the political relations between individual subnational units and the center, the more bilateral channels are pursued and the multilateral ones ignored or bypassed.
While the political and scholarly discourse too often looks at how second chambers could be made more effective in representing subnational interests, it forgets that the issue is participation, that participation takes place outside of second chambers and that in a growing number of cases the main problem is to determine the right balance between individual and collective bargaining between the levels of government. In other words, the fundamental question for subnational representation, participation and cooperation does not concern bicameralism, but increasingly bilateralism. How much bilateralism is necessary and how much is tolerable within a constitutional framework is a matter of complex institutional engineering that depends on many variables in each constitutional system.
In general terms, the growing appeal of bilateralism is due to three main reasons: first, the ineffectiveness of multilateral fora; second, the degree of asymmetry among territories; third the adversarial rather than cooperative political culture. Of course, these factors can also be simultaneously present. By way of example, three European cases could be briefly mentioned to illustrate these underlying reasons and the very different impact of bilateralism in different constitutional and political environments. Another case worth mentioning is that of the bilateral relations between the autonomous territorial unit (ATU) of Gagauzia and the state of Moldova, to which it belongs. This peculiar case supports the achievements of this study with regard to the uselessness of parliamentary bodies to serve as fora for negotiations of subnational interests. In the Moldovan case, the parliamentary way has been pursued not by establishing a territorial second chamber, but by parliamentarising bilateral relations with the subnational autonomous entity of Gagauzia. The autonomy of the ATU of Gagauzia was established in 1994 after some violent incidents that affected that region in the aftermath of the civil war in Transdnistria that led to the de facto split of that region from Moldova in 1992. To settle down the conflict, a far-reaching territorial and cultural autonomy was granted in 1994 by means of a special law on autonomy, which however remained largely unimplemented (Protsyk 2010). To set the process in motion, a dialogue process has been started, which included the establishment of a parliamentary working group between the Moldovan Parliament and the People's Assembly of Gagauzia that has begun to work on specific legislative proposals to improve incorporation of the existing autonomous powers within the Moldovan legal and administrative system. The working group has been working for some years but has not produced tangible results so far, also due to the fact that is members changed after every national and subnational election and that the process was highly politicized.
Conclusions. Real vs apparent challenges
Subnational representation and participation at national level is a key issue when looking at the functioning of federal and regional systems. The comparative analysis of the instruments to (try to) achieve that aim shows interesting and challenging trends. However, they go often unnoticed in literature and in political discourse.
There is, in general, a widespread trust in second chambers that does not match reality.
This is not to say that (territorial) second chambers are not useful for several purposes, but simply that they are structurally unable to become effective fora for subnational participation in the national decision-making process. They are suited, in the best case, to represent subnational entities according to a very formalistic approach to representation, but due to the prevalence of the political-parliamentary logic over the territorial one they are in practice unable to be the place where the levels of government meet and negotiate issues of subnational (and of general) interest. Very often the reform of the second chamber is presented as a solution to the problems of the federal structure in several countries, but after all no reform has succeeded to turn second chambers into something they are not designed to be E -65 fora for participation in decision-making. The key for success of such institutions lays precisely in these two elements: as executive-based bodies, they can politically commit their respective level, whereas a parliamentary body cannot but be based on free mandate; furthermore, and even more importantly, they do not simply represent subnational units, but bring together both levels of government, thus enabling for negotiation. In fact, in today's complex multi-level scenery, participation is way more important to subnational units than mere representation. III The Federalists even conceded this bargain nature: 'But it is superfluous to try, by the standard of theory, a part of the Constitution which is allowed on all hands to be the result, not of theory, but 'of a spirit of amity, and that mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensable. … A government more consonant to the wishes of the larger States is not likely to be obtained from the smaller States', Federalist No. 62 . IV This is best illustrated by an anecdote of George Washington explaining to Thomas Jefferson, who had been absent from the Constitutional Convention, the function of the Senate: 'Washington asked, 'Why do you pour your coffee into your saucer?' Jefferson replied, 'To cool it.' 'Even so,' Washington responded, 'we pour legislation into the senatorial saucer to cool it'. Patterson and Mughan, 1999: 15. V BVerfGE 37, 363. VI In fact, especially when the political majority in the Bundesrat is different from the one that supports the federal government in the Bundestag, the Federal Council can become an instrument of political opposition. An interesting case when for political reasons even the principle of compact vote was challenged took place in 2002, when the highly contested reform of immigration law was put to a vote in the Bundesrat (dominated by a conservative majority) after having been passed in the Parliament (then controlled by a social-democratic and green majority). The Land Brandenburg, than ruled by a coalition between christian-democrats (opposition to the federal government) and social-democrats (supporting the federal government) could not agree on a common position and instead of abstaining from voting in the Bundesrat as it happens in such cases, decided to go ahead by splitting the four votes of the Land in the Council, which was subsequently considered unlawful by the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfGE 106, 310 XIII For example, one would never expect to see them constitutionalized in countries such as the US, while it was quite natural that a partial constitutionalization took place in Austria a Switzerland. Poirier and Saunders, 2015: 488-489 mention six main reasons for the different degree of institutionalization of intergovernmental relations: 1) modernity (the older the federations, the less room for formalized intergovernmental relations); 2) the degree of trust between orders of government (the lower the trust, the more likely is formalization), the strength or fragility of subnational units (the more fragile, the more formalized such bodies tend to be); 4) identification of subnational units with minority groups (if so, normally more formalization is demanded); 5) legal culture (stronger formalization is to be noted in civil law countries); 6) democratic accountability (greater institutionalization may be a response to a lack of it). XIV See Watts 1989. XV See recently Medeiros (ed) 2018. XVI In all mentioned cases, also some (normally low formalized) institutions bringing together the subnational assemblies are in place. While forming part of the wider intergovernmental relations, they won't be mentioned here as they do not perform the same function of representation of subnational interests as executive-based ones. XVII More precisely, Puerto Rico has no voting representative in the US Congress but has a Resident Commissioner who has voice in congress but no vote. XVIII As mentioned, no substantial constitutional difference can be identified between the two categories, although such difference might exist in the perception of the federal ideal as well as in the historical evolution of the territorial relations. See Gamper 2005.
XIX
See full list at http://www.seat.mpr.gob.es/dam/es/portal/areas/politica_autonomica/coop_autonomica/Conf_Sectoriale s/Documentacion/Conf_Sect_exist/parrafo/0/CONFERENCIAS-SECTORIALES_REGIMEN_JURIDICO_ACTUALIZADO0.pdf. XX For issues affecting also the local government, the conference meets in joint composition with the homologous conference between state and municipalities. In such case it is called 'unified conference'. XXI See recently Cosulich 2017. In English and with regard to the most significant experience, that of the autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano, see Palermo 2008. XXII As repeatedly confirmed by the constitutional court -see inter alia rulings no. 20/1956, 22/1961, 151/1972, 180/1980, 237/1983, 212/1984 e 160/1985, 213/1998 XXV Examples are countless. In Spain, since the adoption of the 1978 constitution, the reform of the senate is considered the way for a functioning territorial setting (Aja and Albertí Rovira 2005) and very recently a group of distinguished Spanish constitutional lawyers have proposed a reform to the constitution to solve the Catalan (and more generally the territorial) crisis in which the reform of the senate according to the German (or, alternatively, to the Austrian) Bundesrat would be the key for the change (http://idpbarcelona.net/docs/actual/ideas_reforma_constitucion.pdf). Interestingly, in Germany the Bundesrat has been long considered a stumbling block for an effective, accountable and speedy decisionmaking (Fischer, Hirscher, Margedant, Schick and Werner 2004; Sturm 2003; Lhotta 2003; Bauer 2002; Wassermann 2003) , and while structural changes have turned out to be politically and constitutionally not feasible, fine-tuning on the division of powers thus reducing the number of the laws requiring Bundesrat's approval was the main goal of the 'Federalism reform I' adopted in 2006. In Italy the constitutional reform adopted by the Parliament in 2016 but rejected by popular referendum that same year was focused on the reform of the senate and on its supposed regionalization. In Canada the possible reform of the senate has equally been on the political agenda at regular intervals (Docherty 2002) and has recently been revived by a proposal of the government elected in 2015. In Belgium, successive federal reforms have affected the senate, most significantly the most recent one in 2012 -2014 (Dandoy, Dodeigne, Reuchamps and Vandeleene 2015 , but still did the Senate not become the forum for subnational participation. XXVI Occasionally also to support, as seen for the Austrian case.
